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INTRODUCTION
Learning to drive has  been  conceptualised  as  a  series  of  stages  which  take  the  learner  from
mastery of the basic mechanics of driving, through anticipation of other road user’s  behaviour,  to
the development of a driving style consistent with the skill achieved in the first two stages (Parker
& Stradling, 2002).  Deery (1999) suggests that hazard perception is one of the  main  skills  to  be
acquired in the second stage and  that  this  skill  is  poorly  developed  in  the  inexperienced  (and
usually young) driver.
While strategic deliberation has an obvious role  to  play  in  general  decision  making,  and  more
specifically, in hazard perception,  Damasio  (1994,  2004)  has  suggested  that  a  complementary
emotional  learning  system  also  influences  behaviour  independently  from  conscious  strategic
processes.   For  example,  if  a  situation  were  to  develop  that  could  advance  into   something
threatening or dangerous, a feeling of unpleasantness would be produced in the body (i.e.  –  a  gut
feeling)  and  this  bodily  feeling  will  be  marked  against  the  developing  scenario  so  that  the
organism will learn that should this scenario begin  to  be  built  up  again,  the  body  can  respond
earlier (Damasio, 1996).  The process has been labelled the  Somatic  Marker  Hypothesis  (SMH)
(Damasio, 1994).
Damasio writes:
“Somatic markers (SM) are a special  instance  of  feelings  generated  from  secondary
emotions. Those emotions and feelings have been  connected  by  learning  to  predicted
future outcomes of certain scenarios. When a negative SM is juxtaposed to a  particular
future outcome the combination functions as an alarm bell…SMs may operate  covertly
(without coming to consciousness)” (Damasio 1994, page 174)
Therefore, it is likely that if such an emotional process does exist then it  could  be  applied  to  the
driving scenario and specifically the area of hazard perception.     It  is  presupposed  that  somatic
markers would unconsciously bias decision making in such situations (Damasio, 1996).   Damasio
(2004) suggests the application of somatic markers is sub-served by the ventro-medial  pre-frontal
(VMPF) area of  the  brain  and  clinical  populations  with  damage  to  this  area  show  abnormal
learning of punishment  and  reward  in  spite  of  relatively  intact  conscious  strategic  processes.
Support for this and the existence of an unconscious emotional learning system which responds to
threat/punishment  and  gain/reward  has  been  demonstrated  to  operate   in   laboratory   settings
through the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al, 1994, 1997).  Whilst  these  findings  support  the
Somatic Marker Hypothesis, unsurprisingly, the SMH as a neurological framework  has  been  the
focus of debate (Maia & McClelland, 2004; Dunn, Dalgleish &  Lawrence,  2006).   Responses  to
most critiques have been given by Damasio and supporters and a revision  of  the  somatic  marker
hypothesis thus states that:
“the central feature of the somatic marker hypothesis is not  that  non-conscious  biases
accomplish decisions in the absence of conscious knowledge, but  rather  that  emotion-
related signals assist cognitive processes even when they are non-conscious”  (Bechara
et al, 2005, p.159).
Experiencing traumatic/hazardous situations while driving, even when not resulting in injury,  has
been shown  to  be  associated  with  negative  affect  and  increased  concern  for  personal  safety
(Lucas, 2003).  Such development of substantial fear and  anxiety  in  a  real-life  situation,  which
may have dramatic consequences for individuals, would intuitively be exactly the type of situation
where emotional learning would have an influential role in guiding behaviour.  It may be the  case
that development of an emotional  learning  response  /  somatic  marker  to  various  situations  of
potential risk while driving  is  a  critical  component  of  becoming  an  ‘experienced’  driver  and
guides safer driving behaviour in conjunction with improved strategic hazard perception.
The current paper describes two laboratory experiments that were set  up  to  explore  whether  the
principals behind the Somatic Marker Hypothesis can be applied to the realm of driver  behaviour.
Experiment 1 examined the Skin Conductance Response (SCR) of experienced and  inexperienced
drivers  to  three  types  of  still  images.   These  still  images  were  of   ‘safe’,   ‘hazardous’   and
‘developing hazard’ situations.  Subjective judgements of how hazardous the situation appeared to
be were also collected.  It is predicted that experienced and inexperienced drivers will not differ in
their emotional response to safe and hazardous scenarios.  However, if there is emotional  learning
via experience  then  experienced  drivers  should  be  more  likely  than  inexperienced  drivers  to
demonstrate  a  SCR  to  a  picture  portraying  a  potential  hazard.   Such  a  difference  could   be
explained by inexperienced drivers failing to appreciate the potential risk inherent in  the  depicted
situation.  If this were the case then subjective ratings of danger should also show a  difference  by
experience level.  However, if the ratings of danger are similar then this would support the idea  of
an emotional system that operates independently of a cognitive appraisal system.
Experiment  2  built  on  the  results  of  experiment   1   and   examined   the   SCRs   of   Learner,
Inexperienced  and  Experienced  drivers  to  twelve  Driving  Standard  Agency  (DSA)*   Hazard
Perception clips, similar to those used within the UK Hazard Perception Test.  In the same way  as
experiment 1, if emotional learning is to be supported, then it is  expected  that  there  would  be  a
difference between the driver groups SCR during the build up to  a  hazardous  situation,  whereby
experienced drivers would be more likely to elicit a SCR.
* - The Driving Standards Agency (DSA) is not involved with  the  current  research.   Any  views  reported  here  are
those of the researchers alone and are not representative of those of the Driving Standards Agency (DSA).
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Eighteen inexperienced (held UK licence for under 3 years) and 17 experienced drivers  (held  UK
licence for over 3 years) viewed 15 still  images  of  road  situations  (5  safe,  5  hazardous  and  5
‘developing  hazards’)  taken  from  a  commercially   available   CD-ROM.    The   images   were
presented for 5 seconds each.  After each clip, participants were asked  to  rate  on  a  scale  of  1-7
(Safe to  Hazardous)  how  hazardous  the  situation  appeared.   Respiration  and  SCR  data  were
recorded throughout the experiment.  The images were randomly presented  full  screen  on  a  19”
computer    monitor.     A    button    box    was    used    to    record    participants    ratings.     The
psychophysiological  measurements  were   taken   using   Biopac   10   software   and   associated
hardware.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 shows the mean cognitive ratings for how hazardous each still  image  was  judged  to  be.
As can  be  seen,  both  the  experienced  and  inexperienced  drivers  gave  similar  ratings  to  the
Hazards and Developing Hazards.  A Kruskal-Wallis test shows that only the ratings  for  the  safe
images  were   significantly   different   with   experienced   drivers   giving   higher   ratings   than
inexperienced.  However, the crucial comparison is that of ‘developing hazard’ and it can be  seen
that not only do the two ratings not differ in statistical significance, they are also numerically very
similar.
TABLE 1
Mean hazard ratings for still images
|              |Safe             |Developing Hazard |Hazard         |
|Inexperienced |1.58 (.32)       |3.36 (.76)        |4.81 (.77)     |
|Experienced   |2.18 (.97)       |3.49 (1.26)       |4.40 (1.51)    |
|?2            |4.78*            |.11               |.40            |
* p < .05
Table 2 shows the mean number of SCR responses per  stimulus  item  condition  for  experienced
and inexperienced drivers.  Experienced drivers numerically show more SCRs across  all  stimulus
conditions though this  difference  only  reaches  statistical  significance  for  ‘developing  hazard’
items, as shown by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis.
TABLE 2
Mean percentage of responses showing a SCR to the stimulus item
|              |Safe             |Developing Hazard |Hazard         |
|Inexperienced |21.1 (20.0)      |14.4 (20.4)       |24.4 (22.3)    |
|Experienced   |28.2 (23.5)      |34.1 (27.2)       |32.9 (30.8)    |
|?2            |.68              |5.74*             |.47            |
* p < .05
In summary, no difference was  found  for  cognitive  ratings  of  danger  for  ‘developing  hazard’
stimuli between drivers of differing experience yet these stimuli did show a significantly  different
number of emotional responses for experienced and inexperienced drivers.  This lends  support  to
the idea of an emotional learning system that is separate from a cognitive decision making system.
 The inexperienced drivers knew that the developing hazards were riskier  situations  to  encounter
than  safe  situations  but  they  did  not  appear  to  feel  that  they  were  riskier.   In  contrast,  the
experienced drivers treated  developing  hazards  as  emotionally  identical  to  the  actual  hazards
while cognitively recognising  them  as  less  risky  than  a  hazardous  scene.   Experiment  1  also
supports the idea that experience is necessary for  the  formation  of  these  emotional  markers.  If
emotional learning plays a crucial role in safe driving then this component  appears  to  be  lacking
in the inexperienced driver.  The results of experiment  1  call  for  replication  using  stimuli  with
enhanced ecological validity to further explore the effect of experience on the emotional  appraisal
of developing hazards.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHOD
Participants
Eleven learner drivers (m=5;  f=6),  21  inexperienced  (m=9;  f=12)  and  18  experienced  drivers
(m=10; f=8) took part.  Inexperienced drivers were defined as having  held  a  driving  licence  for
less than 3 years (mean = 13.33 months, std dev = 8.86, range  1-29)  and  experienced  drivers  as
having held their licence for over 3 years (mean = 86.22 months, std dev = 43.63, range 36-168).
The learner driver group had a  mean  age  of  21.7  years  (std  dev  =  2.9,  range  17.6-27.3);  the
inexperienced driver group had a mean age of 21.7 years (std dev = 3.6, range 17.8-33.8); and  the
experienced driver group had a mean age of 25.4 years (std dev = 2.9, range 20.3-31.0)
Materials and Apparatus
Twelve Hazard Perception clips were selected  by  the  researchers  from  sixteen  clips  purchased
from the DSA under contract.  Each clip was around one minute in length and involved one  major
hazard.  The twelve clips were randomly  presented  full  screen  on  a  19”  monitor.   Participants
dynamically responded throughout the duration of the clip by using a slider to rate how  hazardous
the  scene  was.   The  slider  was  labelled  ‘Safe’  at   one   end   to   ‘Hazardous’   at   the   other.
Psychophysiological measurements were taken using Biopac 10 software and hardware.
Procedure
Participants were seated approximately  60cm  from  the  computer  monitor  with  the  slider  at  a
comfortable distance on the desk.  Electrodes were attached to the participant’s index  and  middle
finger of their non-dominant hand and they were asked to position a belt attached to  a  respiratory
transducer around their chest.  Heart rate was also monitored although  this  is  not  reported  here.
They were asked to take several large  breaths  in  order  to  check  the  recording  equipment  was
operational and to provide a comparison respiration trace.   Participants  were  informed  that  they
would see twelve clips of normal driving scenarios and asked to imagine that they were the  driver
of the vehicle.   It  was  not  mentioned  that  there  were  any  hazards  in  the  scenes  they  would
encounter.   In  order  for  participants  to  become  accustomed  to  the  slider  and  to   check   the
equipment, each participant had a practice trial before they began.
RESULTS
For a SCR to be included in the data,  it  had  to  be  equal  to  or  exceed  0.05  delta  micro  Mhos
(Dawson, Schell & Filion, 2000).   In  order  to  extract  data  from  participants’  continuous  SCR
response during the HP clips, timing markers were required.
Hazard Start Marker
The start of the hazard was defined using digital video editing  equipment.   This  enabled  the  HP
clips to be broken down into frames with  exact  timings.   The  item  that  eventually  became  the
hazard was defined  and  analysed  for  the  first  frame  in  which  that  item  occurred.   This  was
therefore the Hazard Start Marker as it was the first moment at which the hazard began to be  built
up.
This practise was followed for all clips except clip 12 where two bikers ride along a  parallel  road
for a considerable period of time.  It is only when the  parallel  road  then  joins  with  the  driver’s
road that a hazard ensues.  For clip 12 the hazard start marker  was  defined  from  the  moment  at
which the junction became visible.
Critical Moment Marker
The critical moment was defined as being the moment at which  the  driver  in  the  HP  clip  takes
avoiding action to the hazard.  Avoiding  action  involved  either  braking  or  changing  direction.
Again, using digital video editing equipment allowed for exact timing of this moment.
Event Period
Preliminary analysis indicated that most drivers elicited a large SCR response around  the  Critical
Moment Marker.  The researchers defined this as an  Event  Response.   However,  as  the  critical
moment was the final moment at  which  the  driver  in  the  clip  responded  to  the  hazard,  some
drivers demonstrated this event response prior to our defined Critical Moment Marker.   To  allow
for event response variation, a period of time was  defined  around  the  Critical  Moment  Marker.
This was termed the Event Period.  The Event Period started from 75% of the total hazard time for
each clip to 3 seconds after the Critical Moment  Marker.   All  participants’  event  responses  fell
within this period.  The three seconds after the  Critical  Moment  was  included  as  three  seconds
after a stimulus is presented is the normal range for  including  responses  in  SCR  data  (Dawson,
Schell & Filion, 2000).
Anticipatory Period
The knock on effect of defining the Event Period meant that an area was defined that started  from
the Hazard Start Marker to 75% of the total time of the hazard.  This area was therefore defined as
the Anticipatory Period and any responses within this area  would  be  considered  an  anticipatory
response to the build up of a hazard.
Due to the slight delay of SCR responses (Dawson, Schell &  Filion,  2000)  any  response  within
one second of the Hazard Start was not  included  as  this  may  have  been  caused  by  something
which happened prior to the  start  of  the  hazard  period.   A  demonstration  of  the  Anticipatory
Period, Event Period and timing markers can be seen in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
Demonstration of timing markers and areas used to extract SCR data from participants
responses.
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Anticipatory Score
So that the three experience groups could be compared  for  their  frequency  of  demonstrating  an
anticipatory  response,  an  overall  anticipatory  score  was   produced.    The   anticipatory   score
involved collating the number of clips in which a participant demonstrated a  valid  SCR  response
within the anticipatory area.  If a participant had more  than  one  valid  SCR  response  within  the
anticipatory area, this was only counted as having demonstrating an anticipatory response  for  the
purpose of the anticipatory score.  All participants viewed 12 HP clips and therefore had  12  SCR
readings that could  be  coded  using  the  above  definition.   However,  as  SCR  is  an  extremely
sensitive measure, interference can cause a  change  in  SCR  that  compromises  the  reliability  of
measuring an emotional  response.   Irregular  respiration  (as  measured  by  the  respiration  belt),
sudden movement or a technical fault, were all reasons for excluding some hazard responses  from
the current sample.  Therefore, although a participant had viewed 12 clips they may not  have  had
valid data for all 12 clips.  Table 3 summarises the number of excluded cases per clip.
TABLE 3
Number of participants per clip who had a valid response or who were excluded from
analysis.
|       |No. of Valid    |No. of        |Total   |
|       |Responses       |Participants  |        |
|       |                |with excluded |        |
|       |                |data          |        |
|Clip 1 |44              |6             |50      |
|Clip 2 |44              |6             |50      |
|Clip 3 |41              |9             |50      |
|Clip 5 |46              |4             |50      |
|Clip 6 |43              |7             |50      |
|Clip 7 |42              |8             |50      |
|Clip 10|44              |6             |50      |
|Clip 11|45              |5             |50      |
|Clip 12|46              |4             |50      |
|Clip 13|41              |9             |50      |
|Clip 15|45              |5             |50      |
|Clip 16|45              |5             |50      |
The following equation was used to determine a participant’s Anticipatory Score:
                                      No. of clips with an anticipatory response
Anticipatory Score =   -----------------------------------------------------     x 100
                                             No. of clips with a valid response
This therefore gave each participant a percentage score of the percentage of clips that  they  would
demonstrate an anticipatory response.
Anticipatory Score
For the analysis  of  the  Anticipatory  Score,  four  participants  were  excluded  for  having  valid
responses to less than eight of the twelve clips.  Of these four participants, one had no  valid  data;
two had valid data for only two clips;  and  one  had  valid  data  for  only  seven  clips.   All  other
participants had  data  for  at  least  9  clips.   Three  of  the  excluded  participants  were  from  the
inexperienced group and one was from the experienced group.
Table 4 summarises the anticipatory scores for the  3  experience  groups.   A  difference  of  mean
score  can  be  seen  between  the  learner,  inexperienced  and  experienced  groups.    Whilst   the
difference between the mean score of the learner group and the inexperienced group is around 9%,
the experienced group score is just over double that of the  inexperienced  group.   Due  to  a  wide
range of scores within each group, the median score is also  reported  and  suggests  a  similar  but
more extreme trend between the groups.
TABLE 4
Summary of Anticipatory scores by experience group
|Participant    |N          |Mean  |Median|Min   |Max   |SD    |
|Group          |           |(%)   |(%)   |Score |Score |      |
|               |           |      |      |(%)   |(%)   |      |
|Learner        |11         |23.61 |16.67 |0.00  |81.82 |26.20 |
An error bar chart demonstrates that there is a relatively large difference between the  experienced
group and the inexperienced and learner groups with no overlap of the 95% Confidence  Intervals.
However, there was overlap of the 95% CIs between  the  learner  and  inexperienced  groups.    A
plot of mean scores with 95% confidence intervals can be seen in figure 2.
FIGURE 2
Graph of 95% Confidence Interval of participant group’s Anticipatory Scores.
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A one-way Analysis of Variance was performed and suggested  a  significant  difference  between
the  groups  (F(2,43)=9.583;  p<.001).   Post  Hoc  Tukey   analysis   determined   that   significant
differences were found between the experienced group and both the inexperienced group (p=.004)
and  learner  group  (p=.002).   No  significant  difference  was  found  between   the   learner   and
inexperienced groups.
Due to the potential influence of age, gender and exposure when analysing data related to  driving,
a Univariate analysis was performed with age, gender and miles driven in the  past  12  months  as
covariates.    This   demonstrated   that   there   was   still   a   significant    overall    group    effect
(F(2,46)=13.554; p<.001) and that age, gender and miles driven were not significant influences  at
the .05 level.
Inexperienced Drivers
Inexperienced driver responses were further analysed.  Breaking this  group  down  by  number  of
years  driving  (one,  two  or  three  years  since  passing  their  test)  demonstrated  no   significant
difference in anticipatory  score.   However,  a  natural  gap  in  exposure  was  evident  within  the
group, with those who had driven less than 1000 miles in the last 12 months (n=12) and those who
had driven more than 1000 miles in the last 12 months (n=6).  There was  a  significant  difference
in anticipatory score between these two groups (t=-2.456, df=16, p=.026).
The two inexperienced driver groups were compared to the learner and experienced groups.   One-
way ANOVA demonstrates that there is  still  a  significant  overall  group  effect  (F(3,42)=8.647;
p<.001) with  Tukey  post  hoc  analysis  showing  a  significant  difference  between  experienced
drivers and both learners (p=.001) and the less than 1000 miles inexperienced group (p=.001).  No
significant  difference   was   found   between   experienced   drivers   and   the   over   1000   mile
inexperienced group (ns=.713).
Univariate analysis was performed with age, gender and miles  driven  in  the  past  12  months  as
covariates.    This   demonstrated   that   there   was   still   a   significant    overall    group    effect
(F(3,46)=11.820; p<.001) and that age and gender were not significant influences at the .05  level.
However, miles driven in the last 12 months was significant (p=.029).
When  these  two  groups  are   plotted   with   all   driver   groups   a   pattern   emerges   whereby
inexperienced drivers who have driven less than 1000 miles in the previous 12 months differ  little
from learner drivers (see figure 3).  On the contrary, inexperienced drivers who have  driven  more
than 1000 miles in the last 12 months demonstrate a mid range  score  between  the  inexperienced
average and that of experienced drivers.
FIGURE 3
Graph of Anticipatory Score by experience group
DISCUSSION
The results of  experiment  2  build  on  those  of  experiment  1.    Experiment  1  demonstrated  a
significant difference in the proportion of SCRs between inexperienced and experienced drivers to
developing hazards.  Experiment 2 repeated this  finding  and  found  a  further  relationship  when
including  learner  drivers.   However,  experiment  1  also  demonstrated  that  inexperienced  and
experienced drivers cognitively rated developing hazards the same therefore  suggesting  a  crucial
difference between their cognitive and emotional responses.  Unfortunately, similar analysis is not
currently available for experiment 2.   However,  the  results  do  support  the  hypothesis  and  the
theoretical concept of an emotional learning system.
Results  in  experiment  2  suggest  that  during  the  learner  phase,  drivers  have   the   ability   to
emotionally anticipate a low level of hazardous situations.  Furthermore, it would appear that as  a
driver gains UK driving license status, their ability to emotionally anticipate hazards  is  no  better
off.  Only once active experience of solo driving begins do drivers embark on an apparent learning
curve whereby they increase their emotional anticipation of hazards.
Importantly, it was demonstrated that time of having held  a  license  was  not  important  and  that
only through experience of the  task  will  drivers  begin  to  increase  their  ability  to  emotionally
appraise developing hazards.  Concurrent findings of self-report  data  suggest  that  novice  driver
crash risk reduces dramatically after the first  500  miles  of  on-the-road  solo  driving  experience
(McCartt, Shabanova & Leaf, 2003).  This could  be  comparable  to  the  increase  in  anticipatory
score demonstrated within the current sample when having driven more than 1000 miles.
Driver research also reports that initial solo driver experience is more important than even  age  as
an accident reducing factor (Maycock, Lockwood & Lester, 1991;  Forsyth,  Maycock  &  Sexton,
1995).  Yet despite this, there is little understanding of the process by which this initial  crash  risk
reduces.  During this period, the vast majority of novice  drivers  are  not  undergoing  any  further
education or training, yet  they  are  continuing  to  learn  something.   The  current  results  would
suggest that the driver is learning processes that allow an emotional appraisal of  the  driving  task
that facilitates an early warning of potential hazards.
Of course, the role of feelings and emotion in driving is not foundationless (Fuller, 2006; Kinnear,
Stradling & McVey, In Press; Vaa, 2005).   In  support  of  the  Task  Capability  Interface  model,
Fuller (2005) and Kinnear et al (In Press) reported finding that drivers rate their feelings of risk  in
the same way as they rate the difficulty of the task.  This suggests that the feedback which  drivers
receive from the driving scenario may be appreciated through feelings, hence allowing a driver  to
understand both the difficulty and the risk of the task at the same time.  If this were  the  case  then
the current results would lend further support for the role of emotions and feelings  in  the  driving
task.
CONCLUSION
In  conclusion,  three  important  points  are  of  note  across  the  two  experiments.   Firstly,  both
experiments have  demonstrated  a  difference  in  the  SCR  rate  to  developing  hazards  between
inexperienced and experienced drivers.  Secondly, experiment 1 provided evidence that emotional
appraisal  of  potentially  hazardous  situations  is  something   that   is   separate   from   cognitive
judgement of the scenarios.  And thirdly, experiment  two  demonstrated  a  learning  curve  in  the
emotional appraisal of developing hazards which is mediated by driver experience.  Therefore  the
current paper not only  provides  support  for  the  underlying  principles  of  the  Somatic  Marker
Hypothesis being applied to driver behaviour, but it also suggests that we do drive as we feel.
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